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Judge Buckley would have held that

the Director's decision was unreviewable.

The . petn for rehearing

en bane was denied by an equally divided ct.
I agree with the SG that the reviewability of the Director's
personnel decisions is an issue of national
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resp's name--must be kept secret for national security reasons.
If r~sp does seek to introduce confidential material, the Director can invoke the state secrets privilege.
··'

I recommend that you vote to DENY.
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SUMMARY:

Resp is a CIA employee and admitted hanosexual

----,

------

who was discharged pursuant to petr's discretionary power under
§102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 u.s.c. §403(c)l,
to discharge employees when he deems such termination "necessary
or advisable in the interests of the United States .••• "

CADC

held that the termination is reviewable under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and remanded the case so the DC could
consider whether resp was discharged for homosexual orientation,
as opposed to conduct, and if so whether such a discharge is
constitutional and is "necessary or advisable in the interests of
the United States."

Petr contends that §102(c) precludes

judicial review, and resp/cross-petr
contends that he is entitled
.I
---------:>

to a statement by the Agency of the reason he was deemed a
security risk.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELCW:

Resp began working with the

CIA in 1973, when he was 17, as a clerk-typist.

He eventually

acquired non-probationary status and was promoted after training

-----------=--

to a covert position as an electronics technician.

Throughout

his employment resp received acceptable performance ratings.

lsection 103(c) provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7501 of title 5, or
the provisions of any other law, the Directory of Central
Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of
any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he sball deem such
termination necessary or advisable in t h e ~ e United
States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such
ofrfcer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other
department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for
such employment by the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management."

;

-3-

Resp "became aware of his homosexuality in 1976 and his
orientation was known to his family and immediate friends."
App. 61a.

Petn

On January 28, 1982, resp voluntarily informed a CIA
---------.,

security officer that he was a homosexual. As a result, the CIA
-- - ~--· ----· -------,---····--~------··~---i
placed resp on paid administrative leave on February 2, 1982,
pending an investigation.

On February 12 and 17, resp was

interviewed at length by a security officer, who later informed
resp that all his responses tested true, including his statements
·'

that he had not had sexual relations with foreign nationals and
that he had not disclosed classified information to any sexual
partners.
his sexual

Apparently rei:i'p was unwilling to disclose the names of
artners to t~e CIA.

An Adjudication Report was prepared by the CIA's Office of
Security and forwarded to then-Director Casey.

Resp was allowed

to preview the report, and he prepared a supplement.

Two

security officers had told resp at the time he was placed on
administrative leave that his homosexual activities violated CIA ~ ,.
\ regulations, but the then-Deputy General Counsel told resp's
counsel that hcmosexuality was a security concern that did not
inevitably result in di srnissal.
On April 14, 1982, a security officer informed resp that the
Office of Security had determined that the "circumstances of his
homosexuality" posed a security threat.

Resp sought an

explanation of why the "circumstances" posed such a threat, but
his explanation was denied and no further explanation was
offered.

Resp was asked to resign and declined to do so.

A

1 et ter from the Gener al Counsel's staff informed him that then-

•r

.
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Director Casey "deemed it necessary and advisable in the
interests of the United States" to terminate resp's employment
pursuant to §103 (c).

The CIA indicated that it would give a

positive recommendation to any prospective employer, but that if
resp applied for a job requiring a security clearance he must
inform the CIA, which would tell the prospective employer that
petr had been dismissed because his homosexuality posed a
security threat.
Resp brought suit in the USDC for the Dist. of Columbia,
alleging that petr had dismissed him for his homosexuality and
that his discharge violated the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 9th
Amendments, the APA, and §102(c).

Resp sought reinstatement or,

alternatively, reinstatement to administrative leave,
reconsideration of his status as a security risk, and various
procedural protections, such as a statement of the reasons for
any future dismissal and an opportunity to contest any adverse
final determination.

The DC granted partial summary judgment for

resp, finding that the CIA did not follow its own regulations in
dismissing him.

The DC rejected petr's argument that §102(c)

precludes review of the Director's decision under the APA.
Petr appealed, and a divided CADC vacated the DC's judgment
and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The court

rejected petr's contention that the decision to terminate resp is
not reviewable under the APA.

Section lO(a) of the APA, 5

u.s.c.

§701 (a), prov ides that agency act ion is rev iewabl e "except to the
extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is committed to agency di scr eti on by law."

Section 1 O(a)

~

...
-5-

creates a strong presumption of reviewability, see Bowen v.
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 106 s.ct. 2133 (1986), and
for review to be precluded by statute, there must be clear and
convincing evidence (though not in a rigid evidentiary sense)
that such was Congress' intent.

Block v. Community Nutrition

Institution, 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984).

CADC stated that this

Court "has never found a congressional intent to preclude review
when the statute at issue specifies a standard that at least
purports to limit agency discretion."

Petn App. lOa.

Also,

while this Court has at times inferred an intent to preclude
review from the statutory scheme, see, e.g., Block v. Community
Nutrition Institutio~, supra, such an approach has been limited
to cases involving uniquely complex or otherwise delicately
balanced statutory schemes.

The court concluded that (1) the

language of §102(c) cannot be fairly read to preclude judicial
review, (2) the legislative history is silent on the issue, and
(3) most importantly, the fact that the statute provides a
standard--namely, the termination must be "necessary or advisa~i
in the interests of the United States"--is compelling evidence
that Congress did not intend to preclude review.

The fact that

§102(c) begins with the phrase "Notwithstanding the provisions of
section 7501 of title 5, or the provisions of any other law,"
does not prevent the application of all law; instead, §102(c)
merely replaces one set of standards--the more rigorous
efficiency standard normally applied to the termination of
federal employees--with a new, more relaxed standard: that the
termination be "necessary or advisable in the interests of the

...
-6-

United States."

The only legislative material that supports

petr's view that Congress intended to preclude judicial review is
Senate Report No. 77, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (the Report),
written decades after §102(c) was enacted, which incorrectly
states that courts have interpreted §102 (c) as giving unlimi tea
discretion to the Director.

As contrary authority, CADC cited

its prior decision in Torpats v. McCone, 300 F.2d 914, 915, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 886 (1962), which did not refuse review of the
termination of a CIA employee, but upheld it as within the
authority conferred on the Director by Congress.

CADC concluded

that the Report is irrelevant to Congressional intent in 1947.
CADC next rejected petr's contention that terminations under
§102(c) are committed to the Director's unreviewable discretion.
To prevail on this argument, the Government must establish that
"'the statute is so drawn that a court would have no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of
discretion,'" Petn App. 15a (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 105 s.ct.
1649, 1655 (1985).

Here, there is a meaningful standard: the

termination must be "necessary or advisable in the interests of
the United States."

While courts "[o] bviously

must give

great deference to the [Director's] judgment," judicial review is
nonetheless appropriate.

Petn App. 16a.

CADC stated:

"Without doubt, for example, the Director could
not terminate Black employees simply because they are
black •.•• Indeed, Government counsel conceded at oral
argument that the agency was not prepared to say that

-7-

constitutional claims, or even claims that the Director
acted in excess of his or her statutory authority, are
precluded from review." Id. at 16a-17a.
Additionally, section"""l02(c) requires that an
employee be terminated ~nl~ if the termination advances
the interests of the Unite States. Although the court
cannot second-guess the Di rector's decision that the
termination of an employee is advisable in the interest
of the United States, we must at least satisfy
ourselves that the termination has some relationship to
the interests of the United States. 1r--rd., at 16a-17a.
CADC rejected the DC's conclusion that resp's termination
violated CIA regulations.

This holding is not at issue in the

petn and it is mentioned only in passing in the cros1:1-petn, p.
10, so I will not describe the court's reasoning in detail.
The court stated that it would review the Director's
decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard.

It recognized

that the Director's decisions are "'worthy of great deference
given the magnitude of the national security interests and
potential risks at stake,'" and particularly so because"' [i]t is
conceivable that the mere explanation of why information must be
withheld can convey valuable information to a foreign
intelligence agency.'"

Id., at 23a-24a (quoting CIA v. Sims, 105

s.ct. 1881, 1893 (1985)).
The court considered three possible reasons for petr's
action, and indicated how it would deal with each.

First, if

petr intended to invoke §102 (c) for reasons other than resp' s
homosexuality, and without stating a reason, resp has the burden
of showing concrete evidence that §102(c) is being used as a
sham.

Resp has produced no such evidence, and cannot prevail in

the unlikely event that the DC determines that "the Director
intended to invoke §102(c) without [giving any] reasons in this

;

-8-

case .... "

Petn App. 26a.

Second, petr may have acted pursuant

to a CIA policy barring the employment of all homosexuals.

CADC

stated that while homosexual conduct is not constitutionally
protected, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986), it is
arguably a constitutional violati on to discriminate on the basis
of homosexual orientation alone.

"At the very least, the CIA

would have to justify why such a ban on the employment of all
homosexuals was 'necessary or advisable in the interests of the
United States."'

Petn App. 27a.

'.!'_hird, petr may have terminated

resp because his homosexuality presents a security risk.

CADC

did not believe that this would present a colorable substantive
constitutional claim, but found resp to have an arguable claim
that the CIA deprived him of his liberty interest in reputation
without due process.

However, the court reviewed the process

accorded resp, and concluded that he had had an adequate
opportunity to contest any allegation that his homosexuality
presented a security risk.
Concurring and dissenting, Judge Buckley agreed that resp
had received due process and that resp's discharge did not
violate CIA regulations, but would have held that the Director's
decision is unreviewable under the APA.

Judge Buckley faulted

the majority for concluding that because the absence of standards
implies unreviewability, see Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S.Ct. 1649,
1655 (1985), the presence of standards necessarily implies
reviewability.

Also, he rejected the majority's view that intent

to preclude judicial review can be inferred from the statutory
scheme only when it is complex.

He concluded that the risk of

-9-

compromising national security through judicial intrusion weighs
against granting review under the APA.
Judge Buckley found the "notwithstanding" clause of §102(c)
clear evidence that Congress intended to prohibit judicial
review.

Section 102(c) was enacted at a time when federal

personnel actions were not subject to judicial review.
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 406 (1976) .2

See

Congress had

adopted the Lloyd-LaFollette ict granting federal employees
limited employment and procedural questions, but §102(c) stripped
CIA employees of even these limited protections.

It makes no

sense to believe that Congress nonetheless intended to preserve a
right to judicial review.

The majority errs in reading §102(c)

to require that the termination be in the national interest: all
the statute requires is that the Director deem the termination to
be in the national interest.

A court may properly inquire

whether the Director made such a determination, but it may not
inquire whether such a determination was correct.

Judge Buckley

was also unable to agree with the majority that a CIA policy
against employing homosexuals would constitute even an arguable
violation of the constitution.

He found no need to ranand for

consideration whether the Director acted within his statutory
authority, since the Director's affidavit establishes that he
discharged resp on the ground that this was necessary and
advisable in the interests of the United States.

2section 102(c) was enacted in 1947, after the passage of the
APA in 1946. The cases cited in United States v. Testan for the
proposition that federal personnel actions were long held not
subject to judicial review date from the turn of the century.

-10Concurring, Judge Ginsburg pointed out that the majority and
partial dissent agree on two points: (1) courts do not sit to
review the wisdom of the Director's determinations on security
matters, and (2) courts may inquire whether the Director acted
within his statutory authority.

The apparent difference is that

the partial dissent "would not necessarily extend court review to
the Director's compliance with the nation's highest law."

Petn

App. 33a.
A petn for rehearing en bane was denied by an equally
divided vote (5-5), with Judges Bork, Starr, Silberman, Buckley,
and Williams voting to rehear.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr argues that "[t]his case presents a

question of exceptional national importance regarding the ability
of the Director of Central Intelligence to maintain the
confidentiality of the Agency's personnel policies and actions."
Petn 10.

The text of §102(c) shows that the Director's decisions

are unreviewable: he is given "discretion" to dismiss "any"
officer or employee "whenever he shall deem such termination
necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States."
Cf., e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 165 (1948)

(Alien

Enemy Act of 1798, granting the President power to exclude alien
enemies, precludes judicial review).

Petr repeats all of the

points made below by Judge Buckley and adds that any disclosure
of CIA personnel practices compromises security.
While this Court has stated that a "serious constitutional
problem" would be presented by a statute that precludes review of
constitutional claims, Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family

-11Physicians, 106 s.ct. 2133, 2141, n. 12 (1986), petr argues that
the question must be faced in this case.

Section 102(c) does not

distinguish between constitutional and nonconstitutional claims.
The statute's complete preclusion of judicial review is
constitutional because it serves the paramount interest in
national security and is limited to the narrow circumstances of
termination of a voluntary employment relationship with the CIA.
Petr argues that the decision below is inconsistent with ·
several prior CADC decisions.

See, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 235

F.2d 215, 218 (CADC), rev'd on other grounds, 354 U.S. 363 (1957)
(in reviewing discharge pursuant to grant of authority to
Secretary of State to terminate "in his absolute discretion" any
employee "whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or
advisable in the interests of the United States," a court's
function is limited to determining whether any procedural
requirement of the statute was violated).

The decision below

also conflicts with Baker v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 760
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981).

In Baker, CIA

employees discharged as part of a reduction in force under a
regulation implementing §102(c) argued, inter alia, that their
discharge was for reasons other than the interests of the United
States and in violation of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944.
'!be Court of Claims held that the plaintiffs had failed to state
a claim because §102(c) gave the Director "the absolute right to
terminate any employee whenever he deemed it necessary or
advisable. "

I a. , at 76 2 ( internal quotations omit tea) •

Baker is

current authority because the CAFC has adopted Ct. of Claims

-12decisions as precedent.

The conflict is significant because

former CIA employees seeking back pay must litigate before the
CAFC.

Resp argues that the only real question presented by this
case is whether §102(c) precludes review of a constitutional
claim, since his constitutional claim is all that remains to be
resolved on remand.

The Government is arguing for the first time

before this Court that §102(c) precludes review of constitutional
claims; below, it conceded the issue.

See Petn App. 17a.

It is

best to let the remand proceed; the issue of the reviewability of
constitutional claims may "disappear" if the DC determines that
on the facts of this case resp has no constitutional claim.
Resp also argues that petr exaggerates the importance of the
decision below to national security.

With the exception of

resp' s name, the CIA has never contended that any part of the
record is classified or otherwise requires confidential
treatment.

If confidential material were implicated, the

Director could invoke the state secrets privilege.
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).

See United

Complaints that adverse

personnel actions are unconstitutional have been dismissed when
the government could not, for reasons of security, disclose the
reasons for its actions.
1984).

Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815 (CADC

Furthermore, the CIA is subject to suit under Title VII,

see, e.g., Brown v. Turner, 490 F. Supp. 939 {D.D.C. 1980),
aff'd, 659 F.2d 1199 {CADC 1981), and this suit does not expose
the CIA to any qualitatively different litigation than it already
faces under Title VII.

The decision below is distinguishable

-13from Baker v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 760 (1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981) because no constitutional claim was
raised in Baker.

Finally, resp argues that the decision below is

correct, for much the same reasons stated by· the panel majority.
In the Cross-Petn, resp/cross-petr seeks a conditional grant
on the question whether he is entitled to a statement of reasons
for the Agency's determination that his homosexuality creates a
security risk.

Resp/cross-petr points out that the CIA never

asserted that it withheld from him the Office of Security's
adjudication on the ground that disclosure would create a
security risk.

The decision below is allegedly inconsistent with

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, which
holds that an employee with a property interest in continued
employment has the right, prior to termination, to "oral or
written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the
employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of
the story."

Id., at 546 .3

Also, 5 u.s.C.§555(e) provides that a

person subject to informal agency adjudication is entitled to
know the reasons for the agency's proposed action.

'!be decision

below inverted the usual rule of constitutional and
administrative law by giving resp the burden of showing that the
Agency's determination was improper before the Agency had to
explain its actions.

3Resp contends that CADC failed to address his claim that he
had a property interest in continued employment. Petn in No. 861442, at 5. Petr/cross-resp argues that CADC implicitly rejected
that claim. Memorandum in Opposition in No. 86-1442, p. 3, n. 2.

... .

-·
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Petr/cross-resp argues that the cross-petn should be denied
because it presents neither a conflict nor a signficant
constitutional or statutory question, for the following reasons:
(1) Loudermill is inapposite because petr is not a tenured
employee.

(2) CADC correctly held that petr received all the

process that is due with respect to any liberty interest he has
in protecting his reputation.

(3) The Director should not be

required to justify nondisclosure of the reasons for termination
on a case-by-case basis, because this could itself compromise
security.

u.s.c. §555(e) does not apply to decisions

(4) Title 5

regarding selection or tenure of an employee, because under 5

u.s.c. §554(a) (2), such a decision is not an adjudication, and a
decision regarding selection or tenure of an employee doesn't fit
any other class of agency proceedings as defined by 5
§§551(5), (7), (9), and (12).

u.s.c.

Moreover, it would be illogicc1l to

apply the procedural protections of §555(e) when §102(c)
explicitly withholds similar procedural protections provided by
the civil service laws.

(5) Resp/cross-petr' s reliance on CIA

regulations is frivolous: the regulations expressly preserve the
Director's discretion under §102 (c) to remove an employee
summarily without a statement of reasons.
4.

DISClJSSION:

Petr has fairly strong arguments and the

issue is obviously important.

The decision below is in tension,

though not square conflict, with Baker v. United States, 224 Ct.
Cl. 760 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981).

Although

Baker was not an APA case and did not involve constitutional

-15claims, it supports the view that terminations under §102 (c) are
exempt from j udi ci al s er ut i ny.
One argument for denial is that the issues left for remand

---

--

-

are resp's constitutional claims, and petr did not argue below
that §102(c) precludes judicial review of such claims.
App. 17a.

See Petn

Whether the Court should bypass the usual requirement

that an argument presented here have been presented below depends
on a judgment call as to how how immediate a threat to national
security CADC' s decision poses.
point.

I have no expertise on that

Petr, who is expert, claims that the issue is one of

"exceptional public importance," but does not state that the
remand in this case immediately threatens national security.
Resp makes a fairly persuasive argument that on remai:_id petr can
still assert a privilege for any matter whose disclosure would
compromise security.

If resp prevails on remand the Court can

always take the case at that juncture.

Also, if resp loses on

remand and another suit 1 ike this one is brought, petr could
probably bring the issue of reviewability up on an interlocutory
appeal.

Cf. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985)

("the

denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order
appealabl e before final judgment") •
denying cert is a reasonable option.

Under these circumstances,
That is my recommendation.

But it can also be reasonably argued that the case is incorrectly
decided and the issue important enough to consider an argument
not presented below.

If the Court grants No. 86-1294, a grant in

the cross-petn should not consm1e overmuch time, although I doubt
that petr would prevail on the cross-petn.

-165.

RECOMMENDATION:

Deny.

There is a response.
April 29, 1987

Dimon
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June 2, 1987

86-1294 Gates, Acting Director of CIA v. Doe

Dear Byron:
Please add my name to your dissent from denial of
cert, circulated by you on May 27.
I am not unaware that I changed m'J original vote at
the last Conference, acting on my understanding then that
because of CADC's remand to the District Court its decision
was not final. Your dissent, plus more careful consideration of the case, makes clear that on the question whether
the Director of the CIA has unreviewable discretion to discharge an employee, the decision of CADC is final.
This is an important question implicating national
security, and I now think we should resolve it.
Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

June 4, 1987
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JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
.
~ qJ ~ ~
The respondent in this case was discharged by petitioner,
.
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, on account //lu. d.. _.-,. -1,..,~
of acknowledged homosexuality. The Director stated that
d~ 1
he considered it "necessary and advisable in the interests of ~ L-<.A, ' ~
the United States" to terminate respondent, which he did/JA" h~,,.. . . 1 ~
pursuant to his power under Section 102(c) of the Nationaf ' - - ~ - - "
Security Act of 1947, 50 U. S. C. § 403(c). * Respondent £A......-" ~
sought judicial review, alleging that his discharge violated
various statutory and constitutional provisions. The Dis- ~ A- ~
trict Court granted relief, holding that petitioner had vio. ,.
lated the CIA's own regulations in discharging respondents.ct ~
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disAl /
.I
agreed with this holding, but a majority of the p~lso reA.>'--'-- ~
jecteE_ petitioner's contention that Section 102(c) precludes ~
judic~ r~w un er t e
mm1strative Procedure Act, 5
U. S. C. § 702 et seq. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remantled the case so that the District Court could consider
whether petitioner has a policy of discharging all persons
with homosexual orientation, and if so, whether such a policy
is constitutional.

h

l

*Section 102(c) provides in relevant part:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7501 of title 5, or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his
discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the
Agency whenever he shall dee such termination necessq or advisable in
the interests o the United States ....

\
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GATES v. DOE

The decision below is in tension with Baker v. United
States, 224 Ct. CL 760 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 1040
(1981), which held that CIA employees challenging their discharge under § 102(c) on statutory grounds failed to state a
claim because § 102(c) gives the Director" 'the absolute right
to terminate any employee whenever he deem[s] it necessary
or advisable."' Id., at 762 (quoting Rhodes v. United States,
156 Ct. CL 31, 36, cert. denied, 371 U. S. 821 (1962)). Moreover, the decision below may affect the Director's ability to
maintain secrecy in national security matters, a matter of
utmost concern. I respe..9tfully dissent from the denial of
certiorari.
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